RUGENDAS. (Johann Moritz) HABITANTE DE GOYAS, QUADRO A ÓLEO PINTADO SOBRE MADEIRA.

     
 
 

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MOTIVEN, DIE DE OFFICIERS DER MILITIE EN DE HOOGE-RADEN IN BRASIL,

hebben bewoogen met de Portugueesen te Contracteren. [In ‘t Reciffe den 22 Maert, Anno 1654] Gredruckt ‘t Iaer ons Herren 1654. [Companhia Holandesa da Índias Ocidentais, Recife 1654].

In 8.º de 18,5 x 14,5 cm. com 2 fólios inumerados.

Exemplar em brochura da época preservado o folheto solto em pasta de pergaminho rígido encadernado ao gosto da época. Levemente aparado junto ao pé do segundo fólio.

Obra de extrema raridade da qual existem duas edições com a mesma data. Em nossa opinião este opusculo será muito provavelmente de um dos primeiros impressos tipográficos no Brasil.

Durante muitos anos do século vinte um outro folheto da mesma companhia holandesa (no qual foram utilizados tipos presentes neste opusculo) foi considerado como o primeiro livro impresso no Brasil.

Mais tarde alguns especialistas brasileiros afirmaram que tal primazia não era verdadeira, 'porque Nassau nunca chegou a receber o tipografo que requisitou para o Brasil'. Tal argumento parece-nos muito dúbio, entre vários outros motivos porque para imprimir um folheto de quatro páginas, concerteza não seria de todo necessário uma tipografia clássica, bastaria apenas um pequeno prelo de campanha operado por um simples ajudante de tipografo. Curiosamente o texto desta mesma obra prova que esta nossa afirmação tem algum sentido, ao afirmar que os portugueses faziam circular junto dos soldados holandeses panfletos com contra informação militar.

 Tradução portuguesa: Motivos pelos quais os oficiais da milícia e os altos conselheiros holandeses no Brasil foram induzidos a negociar com os [altos dignatários] portugueses, o que resultou em um tratado [de capitulação militar] entre a Companhia Holandesa das Índias Ocidentais e os Portugueses sobre a rendição militar do Brasil holandês. No cólofon: « No Recife de 22 Março de 1654 »].

 Motives by which the officers of the militia and high councelors in Brazil have been induced to treat with the Portuguese, resulting in a treaty between the Dutch West India Company and the Portuguese about the surrender of Dutch Brazil. At the colophon: « In 't Reciffe den 22 Maert, anno 1654».

 Teile von Brasilien wurde durch die Westindische Kompagnie (WIC) von Bahia aus ab 1624 in Besitz genommen. Die systematische Vertreibung der Holländer ab 1648 endete am 27. Januar mit der Aufgabe von Pernambuco, dem letzten Stützpunkt. Hier vorliegend die Begründung der Kapitulation vor den Portugiesen, datiert auf den 23. Januar.('... Dat oock gheen volck meer te vinden is om teghen den Vyandt te werken...). Kolophon: Recife, den 22. März 1654 .

 Territórios do Brasil que foram tomados pela Companhia das Índias Ocidentais de (WIC) da Baía em 1624 e em sua posse. A expulsão sistemática dos holandeses de 1648 terminou em 27 de Janeiro, com a tomada do último reduto em Pernambuco. Aqui apresentamos as razões para a capitulação dos holandeses aos portugueses, datada de 23 de Janeiro. Considerações finais: Recife, 22 de Março de 1654.

Raríssimo opúsculo muito provavelmente impresso no Brasil, com a explicação holandesa para sua rendição militar no Brasil, depois de mais de trinta anos de ocupação.

Este tortuoso conflito arrastou-se durante décadas acabando com a vitória dos portugueses no Brasil, considerado a primeira guerra militar e comercial a nível global entre europeus pelo domínio do Mundo. Portugal foi envolvido no conflito pela união com Castela em 1580. Antes do fim do conflito Portugal, e embora tendo perdido muito para os holandeses no Oriente e no Extremo Oriente, conseguiu a muito custo manter as suas possessões africanas e derrotar cabalmente o inimigo no Brasil, ainda assim como restaurar e consolidar a independência nacional contra as grandes pretensões em contrário da Espanha. Sem esta espectacular vitória militar, que se considera o primeiro passo para a independência dos povos americanos, seguramente que Portugal não teria tido magnífico período do reinado de D. João V que foi sustentado pelas riquezas brasileiras.

 Territories of Bahia, Brazil, that were taken by the Company of the West Indies (WIC) in 1624 and in his possession. The systematic expulsion of the Dutch 1648 ended on 27 January, with taking the last stronghold in Pernambuco. Here are the reasons for the capitulation of the Dutch to the Portuguese, dated January 23rd 1654. Final considerations: Recife, March 22, 1654.

Probably it’s a very rare pamphlet printed in Brazil, with the explanation for the Dutch military surrender in Brazil, after more than thirty years of occupation. This tortuous conflict dragged on for decades, ending with the victory of the Portuguese in Brazil, considered the first military and commercial war - at global level - amongst Europeans for control of the world commerce. Portugal was involved in the conflict by the union with Castile in 1580.

Before the end of the conflict Portugal - although having lost to the Dutch some Eastern and Far Eastern possessions – had a great difficulty managing to keep their African possessions and fully defeat the enemy in Brazil, still restoring and consolidating national independence against great pretensions of Spain. Without this spectacular military victory, which is considered the first step towards the independence of the American people, surely that Portugal would not have had a magnificent period during the reign of King John V, mainly supported by the Brazilian wealth.

Borba de Moraes II, p.599; Rodrigues 684; Knuttel 7537; Asher 283; Sabin 51102.

TEXTO ORIGINAL EM HOLANDÊS DA ÉPOCA:

[NL] MOTIVEN, Die de Officiers der Militie en de Hooge-Raden in BRASIL, hebben bewoogen met de Portugeesen te Contracteren. Gedruckt in ‘t Iaer ons Heeren 1654.

MOTIVEN, Die de Officieren der Melitie in consideratie hebben gnenomen, om met den Vyandt in accoort te treden, Adij den 23 Jnuary 1654.

Ten eersten, Om dat Officieren der Melitie weynigth staet op de Soldaten konnem maecken, noch op haer Borgerye vertrouwen, eensdeels door de vreem de geruchten, die haer dagelijcks van ter zijden ter ooren quamen, andersins door de exempelen alreets a en de Forten Selines Alterna, en jongst aen ‘t Houte Wambays, en aen Amelia bespeurt is.

Ten tweeden, Om dat als wy de Forten Gogh Barette, ‘t Fort op’ t Eylandt Prins Willem met sijn Reduyten hadden verlaten, ende ‘t Volck in-ghetrocken, oock noch 1120 man soo Blancken als Brasilianen, ter nauwer noot van Pareba hebben konnen bekomen niet meer als 1100 koppea, de Negers en Brasilianen daer mede onder gereeckent, hebben konnen te wegebrengen, waer mede wy alle onse ‘t Fort Wardenburck de Bruyn met sijn Reduyten, ‘t Water en landt Casteel, daer-en-boven’t Recife ende Mauris Stadt hebben moeten besetten, die naenwelijcks met deselve have besettinge konnen hebben.

Ten derden, Om dat wy ons te Water alsoo beslootem ende benauwt vonden, datter qualijcken een Singael konde passereen van de buyten plaetsen, in cas van nootte konnen bekomen, dat oock de Oorloghschepen ons tout secours toegesonden, als mede de Partiquekere Cruyssers schoon sy op ontboden zijn, hebben by nae gheweygert te komen, noch de Soldaten die wy haer geleet hebben, wel 140 man in ‘t ghetal ons wederom te senden, gelijck oock mede ‘t begin als de Portugueesche Vloote alhier tem Ancker was gekomen, ons hadde verlaten, ende quansuys van de kuste ghewendt.

Ten vierden, Om dat des’s morghens als den Vyandt voor ‘t Fort Frederik Hendrick was gekomen, ende sich aldaer begraven hadden, by de Officieren een voorslag is gedaen, om een proeve op des Vyants wercken te doen, ‘t welck geschiet is, sonder yets op deselve te winnen, en dat de onse naer 16 doode[~] en gequetsten bekomen hebbende zyn ghenootsaeckt gheweest wederom te retireren, aengesien de Vyand sijn Wercken op nacht soo vast ghemaeckt hadden, datse noch met kleyn noch met kleyn noch met groote Tropen daer uyt souden konnen werden gedreven, noch van ons Canou beschadight worden.

Ten vijfden, Iae alwaert dat wy met alle onse macht wy daer toe te samen koden trecken, en alle andere Forten ontblooten, soo souden wy haer daer niet konnen uyt driven, en ‘t selve wederon in-nemen, alwaert dat wy alle resteerende Forten ontblooten, en haertot een prove over gaven; aengesien ons gantsche Militie als boven verhaelt is top op ‘t getal van 1100 man was gesmolten, wy allen om het Fort Frederik Hendric te besetten, tem minsten 6 a 800 man van doen hadden soo tot arbey den ende verdubbelinghen van de Borstweeringh, die mits hare swackheydt voor gheen Kanon vry was : datter in de resteerende Forten ende Plaetsen boven ghenoemt, maer overigh souden blijven 300 mam, behalven de Compagnie Neghers van 37 man, ende wat besloore Brasilianen die in een Fort zijn, is gebleken in ‘t Fort Altena ende Frederick Hendrick: met troppen geloopen, sonder daer weder in willen keeren.

Ten sesten dat de Hooge Raden in hare Vergaderinge, ende de Overste Gecommiteerde uyt alle Collegien, hadden verklaert geen gelt ofre Mterialen meer te hebben om desen Oorlogh langerte konnem uyt voeren, dat, dat oock by de particuliere geen gelt, maer wel eenighe Koopmanschapte bekomen waren; die by dese constitutie van tijdt niet te gelde konde gemaeckt worden. Ten sevenden, Dat oocgheen volck meer te vinden is om teghen den Vyandt te wercken, ende hare Apochis teghen te gaen, maer ter contrarye dat dagelijcks veele Neghers die tot ghebruyckt worden met grooten troppen den Vyandt overloopen, ende de weynigh werckers die noch te viden zijn, konnen niet continuelijcken; by ghebreck van Materialen ende Gelt door dien volghens verklaren van de Hooge Regeeringe, de Casse [Caffe] gantsch tem eynde is.

Ten achtsten, Om dat in cas de vyandt in weynighe daghen sijn Aprochie komt te naerderen, ghelijck hy alrede heest begonnen, hy ‘t Fort rontsom sal besluy tem, ende ons drinck-water sal afluyten, waer door wy dan in de uytterste extremiteyt souden vervallen: Iae dat de overdaet onser eygener Soldaten soo verre ghekomen is, dat deselve sonder oorfaeck haerder Officieren haer openbaerlijck lieten verluyden, datse onse eyghen Burgers wouden pluderen; dat oock de Overste Luytenant aen den Luy-tenant Generael geklaeght heeft, dat de Soldaten van sijn Fort Frederick Hendrick niet ontsaghen, soo haest de vyandt ‘t Fort beslooten hadde, sy hem handen ende voeten binden, ende hem also aen den Vyandt over geven, om daer door tot een goet accoort te komen, tot wecke de Biljetten onlanghs vanden Vyandt uytgestroyt, genn kleyne operatie hebben gedaen.

Ten Negenden, Om dat ons geen secours dat de yeghenwoordighe macht des Vyandts foude konnen substiveren te verwachen state, immers dat gantsch onseker is. Ten thienden, Om dat als men al gretacht hadde noch eenighe daghen teghen te houden, ende het alder uyterste aft e wachten, het seecker was dat onse macht teghengs de macht des Vyandts niet soude hebben konnen bestaen, ofte substineeren dat oock daer by te vresen stont, dat de meeste Raet der Soldaten in cas van sulcken not en om vordere verhaelde Motiven niet souden hebben willen vechten, maer haer geweer neder-leggen tegens wlle der Officieren om een goet accort souden spreecken; latende haer verluyden soo haest de Portugueesche Vloot alhier op de Reede geset lagh, gelijck sulcks genoegh uyt de geruchten gehoort is, dat nu den dagh haerder verlossinghe voor haden was, en dat sy aen haer-lieder zyden haren Eet, aengesien den tijdt waer voor sy lieden waren aengenomen, dubblrt hadden voldaen, maer dat by geenen die haer aengenomen hadde, geen woort was gehounden.

Ten elfden, Soo eyndelijck in cas tot het uytterste worde gewacht, sonder van eenig accoort te sperken, en de saeck wat uyt willende stellen als voorseyt, als dan geen apparentie sound wesen voor ‘t Lant te behouden. De Compagnie, de Gemeente, veel min de Militie om By verre soo nae gee Conditie te verkrijgen soude wesen, maer soude in genade en ongenade in Vyandts handen moeten vervallen, waer door veel duysent zielen so vrouwen als kideren souden komen te sneuvelen, welcker bloet de Officieren ongeern op haer souden halen.

Dese boverenstaende Reedenen, hebben Hooge ende gemeene Officieren bewogen om te treden met de Vyandt neffens de Gemeente, die daer alle seer toegenegen waren in onderhandelinge, om tot een goet accoort te komen. In ‘t Reciffe de 22 Maert, Anno 1654.

 Defense of the Dutch decision to surrender Brazil to Portugal [BRAZIL - MILITARIA].

Motiven die de officiers der militie en de Hoge-Raden in Brasil, hebben bewoogen met de Portugeesen te contracteren. [The Netherlands], 1654 (text dated from Recife, 22 March 1654).

4to. With the text in Dutch, set in Dutch roman types. [4] pp.

Modern sheepskin parchment.

One of the only two editions, both very rare (the present dated 1654, the other undated but 1654 or later) of a report written in Dutch, neatly stating in eleven numbered points the reasons why the military officers of Dutch West India Company (WIC) and WIC's Governing Council in Recife, the capital of Dutch Brazil, decided to come to an agreement with the Portuguese enemy, to turn over control of the city (and by implication all the Dutch territories in Brazil) to Portugal.

The Dutch West India Company, a much more explicitly military organization than the Dutch East India Company (VOC), had taken control of parts of Brazil in 1624, driving out the Portuguese, but from 1648 the Portuguese regained the upper hand. The present report notes the circumstances at many of the individual forts, named in the document, and discusses the circumstances regarding the indigenous Brazilians and the black Africans and their descendents (mostly slaves, though not explicitly noted as such in this report).

The military simply did not have sufficient manpower and the Council had decided not to devote more funds to continuing the war. It also mentions that many of African descent who were set to work to fight the Portuguese defected to the Portuguese side, that the indigenous Brazilians were unreliable for defense, and that the WIC's own soldiers were so badly provisioned that they openly threatened to plunder their own people.

The chief Lieutenant had even complained to the Lieutenant-General that when the Portuguese had surrounded Fort Frederik Hendrik (near Recife) the soldiers declared they would bind his hands and feet and turn him over to the Portuguese in order to reach a better accord. He notes that this plan had been influenced by fliers that the Portuguese had scattered among the men ('biljetten onlanghs van den vyandt uytgestroyt').

The report declares that to continue would have led to the death of many thousands, including women and children. Finally, it notes that the residents were in agreement with the officers' decision. The pamphlet dates the decision 23 January 1654 and the provisional surrender was actually signed on 26 January. It was still expected to go through when the present report was written on 24 March, but although the Dutch never retook Recife, they made new demands in May and they did not actually cede control of Dutch Brazil until the 1661 Treaty of The Hague.

The report does not give the names of the officials who made the decision, but the title-page refers to them as military officers and the Supreme Councilors ('officiers der militie en de Hooge-Raden') and the closing statement as senior and general officers ('hooge ende gemeene officieren').

Trimmed, shaving off half of the last letter of one line of text and a bit of the last letter of one catchword, but otherwise in very good condition and only very slightly browned.

Asher 283; Borba de Moraes, p. 599 (both eds., with an illustration of the other title-pages); Rodrigues 1719; Sabin 51102 (cf. also 7605: the other ed.); STCN (2 copies of the present ed.; 2 copies of the other); WorldCat (same 2 copies of the present ed.; 2 copies of the other); Knuttel 7537 (the other ed.)

 TRADUÇÃO INGLESA:

Motiven, die de officiers der militie en de Hooge-Raden in Brasil, hebben bewoogen met de Portugeesen te contracteren. [The Netherlands], 1654.

[A1r (title-page)] Motives that induced the militia officers and Supreme Councilors in Brazil to come to terms with the Portuguese. Printed in the year of our Lord 1654.

[A1v] Motives that the militia officers have taken into consideration in accepting an accord with the enemy, ad diem 23 January 1654.

First, because the militia officers could not rely on the soldiers, and also could not rely on the citizenry, on the one hand due to the strange rumours that came to their ears daily from the sidelines, and on the other due to the examples already seen with the forts Salinas[,] Altena, and most recently with the wooden fort [at Amelia?] and with Amelia.

Second, because [even] if we had abandoned the forts Gogh, Barette, that on Prince Willem Island with its redoubts, and evacuated the people, another 1120 men, both white and Brazilian, we could in urgent need have gotten from Pareba no more than 1100 heads, including Negroes and Brazilians. With that we would have had to man all our forts that remained, such as Frederik Hendrik, Ernestus, Fort Wardenburck, De Bruyn with its redoubts, the Water and Land Citadel, in addition to Recife and Mauritsstad, while they could hardly have been half manned with that many.

Third, because we found ourselves so cut off and confined on the water that one could hardly send a signal from the outside areas in case of dire need. Even the warships sent to our aid, as well as the independent cruisers though they were called in, nearly [all] refused to come, nor [would they] even send back the soldiers we had leant them, some 140 men in number. So also the ship Brazil, the only one that still remained here for the Company, abandoned us already early on and made a show of turning away from the coast when the Portuguese fleet dropped anchor here.

Fourth, because in the morning when the enemy appeared before Fort Frederik Hendrik and had dug themselves in there, the officers made a trial strike to test the enemy’s fortifications, which being done made no gain at all. While our own [men], after suffering sixteen dead and injured, were forced to retreat, since the enemy had made his fortifications so secure in one night that they could not be forced out with either small or large numbers [of troops], nor be damaged by our cannon.

[A2r] Fifth, even if we could indeed gather all our forces there and strip the other forts bare, we would still be unable to drive them out and retake it for ourselves, even if we stripped all the remaining forts bare and gave them up as a trial. For our entire militia as described above, dwindled to 1100 men in number, [while] we needed at least 600 to 800 men just to man Fort Frederik Hendrik in order to operate and reinforce the parapets, which due to their weakness could not withstand any cannon. That would leave only 300 men in the remaining forts and other sites noted above, besides a 37-man company of negroes. And we have seen in Fort Altena and Frederik Hendrik what decisions Brazilians trapped in a fort do. Sent out of Altena by the commandant as incompetent, to take them to the shore. They [also] abandoned Frederik Hendrik in droves without wanting ever to return.

Sixth, that the Supreme Councilors in their meeting and the Lieutenant Representatives from all governing boards had declared that they had no more money or materials to continue pursuing this war. One could also get no money from the private individuals, though one could get a few goods, which in the circumstances of the time could not be converted to money.

Seventh, that one can no longer find any people to operate against the enemy and to counter their advances. On the contrary, every day many negroes who were set to work defect in large numbers to the enemy. And the few workers who can still be found cannot work continuously; with shortages of materials and money because according to the declaration of the supreme government, the treasury is wholly at its end.

Eighth, because should the enemy further his advances in a few days, as he has already begun to do, he will entirely surround the fort and cut off our drinking water, which would bring us to the utmost extremity. Indeed the excesses of our own soldiers has gone so far that without cause they publicly declare to their officers that they wish to plunder our own citizens. The chief Lieutenant also complained to the Lieutenant-General that the soldiers of his Fort Frederik Hendrik did not quail to say, as soon as the enemy had surrounded the fort, that they wanted to bind his hands and feet and turn him over thus to the enemy in order to reach a good accord. Fliers recently scattered by the enemy made no small contribution to that mutiny.

Ninth, because we can expect no aid that could subvert the present power of the enemy, or at least any such aid is extremely uncertain.

[A2v] Tenth, because if one had tried to resist a very few more days and await the utmost extreme, it is certain that our strength would not have been able to withstand the strength of the enemy. Nor sustain what also was to be feared in that [situation]: that most of the councils of soldiers facing such extremity and for motives further explained would not have wanted to fight, but would have laid down their rifles against the will of their officers in order to negotiate a good accord. They let this be known as soon as the Portuguese fleet established itself in the roadstead here, as such was heard often enough in the rumours, that now that the day of their release had come and that they for their part said that they had fulfilled their oath twice over, given the amount of time for which they had been taken on, but that those who had taken them on had not kept their word.

Eleventh, if in the end they had waited to the last without negotiating any accord, and attempted to prolong the matter as has been said, if then no likelihood had arisen to keep the land, then the Company and community would have been unable to get any conditions, and the militia much less by far. They would have had to fall into the enemy’s hands unconditionally, whereby many thousands of souls would have died, [including] both women and children. The officers would not have wanted that blood on their hands. These reasons, noted above, have induced the senior and general officers to treat with the enemy on behalf of the community, who were all very appreciative of the negotiations to reach a good accord. In Recife, 22 March 1654.

 [A1r] Motivos que levaram os oficiais da milícia e os Conselheiros Supremos no Brasil a aceitar um acordo com os Portugueses. [Impresso no Recife, Brasil ou em Amsterdão, Holanda] No ano de Nosso Senhor 1654.

[A1v] Motivos que os oficiais da milícia tiveram em consideração ao aceitar um acordo com o inimigo, no dia 23 janeiro de 1654.

Primeiro, porque os oficiais da milícia não podiam confiar nos soldados, e também não podiam confiar nos colonos, por um lado, devido aos estranhos rumores que chegavam aos seus ouvidos diariamente, e por outro, devido aos exemplos já vistos nos fortes de Salinas, Altena e mais recentemente com o forte Amelia feito em madeira.

Em segundo lugar, porque [mesmo] se tivéssemos abandonado os fortes Gogh, Barette e aquele na Ilha Príncipe Willem com seus redutos, e evacuado as pessoas, mais 1120 homens, brancos e brasileiros, poderíamos em caso de necessidade urgente ter conseguido a partir de Paraíba não mais de 1100 homens, incluindo negros e brasileiros. Com esses homens teríamos tido que guarnecer todas as nossas fortalezas que permaneceriam, tais como Frederik Hendrik, Ernestus, Fort Wardenburck, De Bruyn com seus redutos, as cidadelas de água e de terra, para além de Recife e Mauritsstad, que dificilmente poderiam ser operados a cinquenta por cento com esta quantidade de homens.

Em terceiro lugar, porque nos encontrávamos tão cercados e confinados na água que dificilmente se poderia enviar um sinal a partir de áreas externas em caso de extrema necessidade. Mesmo os navios de guerra enviados em nossa ajuda, assim como os navios independentes que foram chamados, quase [todos] se recusaram a vir, nem [iriam] até mesmo enviar de volta os soldados que tínhamos cedido, cerca de 140 homens em número. Assim também o navio Brasil, o único que ainda permanecia aqui para a Companhia, nos abandonou logo no início e afastou-se da costa quando a frota Portuguesa aqui ancorou.

Quarto, porque de manhã, quando o inimigo apareceu diante de forte Frederik Hendrik e lá se barricou e fortificou, os nossos oficiais fizeram um ataque para testar as fortificações do inimigo, o qual após concluído não teve qualquer efeito. Enquanto os nossos próprios homens, depois de sofrer dezasseis mortos e feridos, foram forçados a recuar, uma vez que o inimigo tinha feito suas fortificações de modo seguro numa noite e não se conseguiu força-lo a sair nem com pequeno nem com grande número de tropas, nem sequer atingi-lo com o nosso canhão.

[A2r] Em quinto lugar, mesmo se pudéssemos de fato reunir todas as nossas forças ali [forte Frederik Hendrik] e deixar os outros fortes desguarnecidos, seriamos na mesma incapazes de expulsar o inimigo e retomá-lo para nós, mesmo que deixássemos todos os restantes fortes despojados e os dessemos como perdidos. Porque toda a nossa milícia, como descrito acima, diminuiu para 1100 homens em número, [enquanto] que precisava de pelo menos 600 a 800 homens só para guarnecer o Fort Frederik Hendrik, a fim de operar e reforçar os parapeitos, que devido à sua fraqueza não podia resistir a qualquer canhão. (1) Isso deixaria apenas 300 homens nas restantes fortalezas e outros sítios mencionados acima, além de uma companhia de 37 negros. E nós já vimos em Fort Altena e Frederik Hendrik o que as decisões de brasileiros encurralados numa fortaleza podem fazer. (2) Expulsos de Altena pelo comandante como incompetentes, e levados para a praia. (3) Eles [também] tinham abandonado Frederik Hendrik em massa sem quererem de todo voltar.

Sexto, que os Conselheiros Supremos na sua reunião com os representantes de todos os órgãos dirigentes haviam declarado que não tinham mais dinheiro ou materiais para continuar esta guerra. Também não se conseguia obter nenhum dinheiro dos particulares, embora se pudesse obter alguns bens, que nas circunstâncias do momento não podiam ser convertidos em dinheiro.

Em sétimo lugar, não mais se conseguem encontrar pessoas para enfrentar o inimigo e para contrariar os seus avanços. Pelo contrário, a cada dia, muitos dos negros trazidos para trabalhar desertam em grande número para o inimigo. E os poucos trabalhadores que ainda podem ser encontrados não o podem fazer continuamente, com a escassez de materiais e dinheiro, porque de acordo com a declaração do governo supremo, o Tesouro está totalmente falido.

Oitavo, porque se o inimigo avançar ainda mais, o que já começou a fazer, em poucos dias vai cercar completamente o forte e cortar a nossa água potável, o que nos levaria a um estado sem precedentes. Na verdade, as carências dos nossos próprios soldados já foram tão longe que, sem aparente razão declararam publicamente aos seus oficiais que desejam saquear os nossos próprios cidadãos. O comandante militar no terreno também se queixou ao Brigadeiro que os soldados de Fort Frederik Hendrik não se coibiram de dizer que, assim que o inimigo tivesse cercado o forte, queriam atar as suas mãos e pés e entregá-lo assim ao inimigo, a fim de chegar a um bom acordo. Panfletos recentemente espalhados pelo inimigo deram uma grande contribuição para o motim.

Em nono lugar, porque não podemos esperar qualquer ajuda que possa subverter o atual poder do inimigo, ou, pelo menos, receber qualquer ajuda é extremamente improvável. [A2v]

Décimo, porque mesmo se tivéssemos tentado resistir mais alguns dias e aguentar tanto quanto possível, é certo que a nossa força não teria sido capaz de resistir à força do inimigo. Nem sustentar a situação em que a maioria dos conselhos de soldados em tal extremo (e por motivos explicados posteriormente) não teria querido lutar, mas teria deposto as suas armas, contra a vontade dos seus oficiais, a fim de negociar um bom acordo. Eles fizeram saber isto assim que a frota Portuguesa se estabeleceu aqui na enseada, e como tal, foi ouvido muitas vezes nos rumores, que, agora o dia de sua libertação havia chegado e que já tinham cumprido o seu juramento duas vezes, dada a quantidade de tempo que eles tinham servido, e que aqueles que os tinham levado não tinham mantido a sua palavra.

Décimo Primeiro, se no final, eles esperaram até ao último momento sem negociar qualquer acordo, e tentaram prolongar o assunto tal como já foi dito, se, em seguida, nenhuma probabilidade surgiu para manter a terra, a Companhia e a comunidade teriam sido incapazes de obter quaisquer condições e as milícias muito menos. Eles teriam tido que cair nas mãos do inimigo, incondicionalmente, razão pela qual muitos milhares de almas teriam morrido, [inclusive] mulheres e crianças. Os oficiais não quiseram este sangue nas suas mãos. Estas razões, acima mencionadas, induziram os oficiais generais e mais antigos para, em nome da comunidade, tratar com o inimigo, e que todos ficaram muito agradecidos pelas negociações terem chegado a um bom acordo. No Recife, 22 de Março de 1654.


Temáticas

Referência: 1307CS004
Local: raros

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